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INTRODUCTION
This case turns on the application of the Employment Security Act and its related
regulations to a set of egregious, but essentially uncontested, facts. The key findings of
fact, which are not disputed by the parties, were made by an Administrative Law Judge
and adopted in full by the Workforce Appeals Board of the Department of Workforce
Services.
The central question presented in this appeal is whether the Department of
Workforce Services ("Department") properly applied the Employment Security Act to
these undisputed facts. Claimants Christopher Guzman ("Guzman") and Thomas King
("King") were terminated from their employment at Autoliv after the company
discovered, during the course of a sexual harassment investigation, that Guzman and
King had sent a large volume of "vulgar" and "sexually-explicit" e-mails using the
company's computer system. [R. 53; R. 242] The Department reviewed these messages
and found that "such material in the workplace could have subjected the employer to
sexual harassment claims." [R. 132; R. 321] Nevertheless, because the Department
believed that Guzman and King lacked disqualifying knowledge of their misconduct, the
Department granted Claimants' applications for unemployment.
The Department erred by allowing Guzman and King to collect unemployment
benefits. Claimants violated numerous company policies and, more significantly,
universal standards of conduct. As a result, this Court should reverse the Department's
decision and thereby deny Claimants' applications for unemployment benefits.
1
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DISCUSSION
L

THIS COURT OWES NO MORE THAN MODERATE DEFERENCE TO
THE DEPARTMENTS APPLICATION OF THE EMPLOYMENT
SECURITY ACT.
A.

The Applicable Standard of Review Requires This Court to Afford
"Only Moderate Deference" to the Department's Application of the
Employment Security Act.

The issue of whether specific conduct is disqualifying under the Employment
Security Act is a mixed question of law and fact.1 SOS Staffing Services, Inc. v.
Workforce Appeals Bd., 983 P.2d 581, 583 ^8 (Utah Ct. App. 1999) (where the parties do
not dispute the underlying material facts, "the Board's decision 'calls for the application
of statutes and administrative rules to a specific factual situation.'") (quoting Professional
Staff Management, Inc. v. Dep 't of Employment Sec, 953 P.2d 76, 79 (Utah Ct. App.
1998)); accord Professional Staff Management, 953 P.2d at 79 ("[o]ur review of these
[unemployment] cases calls for the application of statutes and administrative rules to a
specific factual situation"). Utah appellate courts afford administrative decisions a
degree of deference along a "sliding scale" of strictness, depending on the policy
concerns, the agency's expertise, and whether the issue is fact-driven or susceptible to
uniform rules. SOS Staffing Services, 983 P.2d 583. It is well-established that the
"proper application of the Employment Security Act and the relevant rules requires little
highly specialized or technical knowledge that would be uniquely within the

"The terms 'application of the law' and 'mixed question of law and fact' have been used
interchangeably by Utah appellate courts." HON. NORMAN H. JACKSON, Utah
Standards of Appellate Review—Revised, Utah Bar Journal, Oct. 1999, at 8, 53 n.31.
2
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Department's expertise." Id. at 584-85; Professional Staff Management, 953 P.2d at 79
(internal punctuation and citation omitted). Accordingly, this Court affords "only
moderate deference" to the Department's decision to grant unemployment benefits.
Professional Staff Management, 953 P.2d at 79-80; SOS Staffing Services, 953 P.2d at
584.
B.

The Standard of Review Suggested by the Department is Inapplicable
and Obsolete.

This Court should reject the Department's bid for unwarranted deference. The
Department contends that "this case involves a question of fact and the standard of
review is 'highly deferential, requiring reversal only if the finding is clearly erroneous . . .
and not supported by substantial evidence.'" Appellee's Brief at 1. The Department then
concludes that its decision to grant unemployment benefits to the Claimants should be
"reversefd] only upon a plain abuse of discretion." Id. The Department's argument thus
combines a false premise with outdated case authority. The Department begins by
mischaracterizing Autoliv's appeal as a challenge to the agency's factual findings, and
then proceeds by relying on case authority older than the governing statute.
This appeal does not contest the Department's essential factual findings; rather,
Autoliv challenges the Department's application of the Employment Security Act to
those facts. The key facts remain undisputed: (1) Autoliv has policies prohibiting sexual
harassment and non-business usage of its e-mail system; (2) Autoliv sent warnings to
Claimants that future violations of the e-mail policy would result in disciplinary action up
to and including termination; (3) after receiving these warnings, Claimants used the
3
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company's computer system to send numerous e-mail messages containing vulgar,
offensive, and sexually-explicit materials; (4) Claimants confessed to having sent a large
volume of inappropriate e-mail messages; and (5) Autoliv terminated Claimants as a
direct result of this misconduct.
The Department's effort to cast its own legal conclusions as factual findings
should be rejected. For example, the Department's position that Claimants lacked
disqualifying knowledge is not a finding of fact; rather, it is a legal conclusion resulting
from the Department's flawed application of selected facts to administrative law.
It is also notable that the Department does not rely on this Court's recent
pronouncements on the proper standard of review in unemployment cases. Instead, to
argue that this Court can reverse "only upon a plain abuse of discretion," the Department
reaches back to Pacheco v. Bd. of Review, 1X1 P.2d 712 (Utah 1986), a case that predates
the adoption of the Uniform Administrative Procedures Act ("UAPA"). See Appellee's
Brief at 1. Given that "Utah courts should not ignore the standards of review pronounced
by the Utah Legislature," it follows that this Court should rely on the standard of review
established by the UAPA as interpreted in SOS Staffing and Professional Staff
Management. Bradley v. Payson City Corp., 413 Utah Adv. Rep. 13, 19 n.3 (Utah Ct.
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App. 2000) (Jackson, J., dissenting).2 Accordingly, this Court should follow its recent
precedent by granting no more than moderate deference to the Department's application
of the Employment Security Act.
C.

Because Claimants Transgressed Universal Standards of Conduct, the
Department's Decision Deserves Little or No Deference.

Although Autoliv acknowledges that the prevailing standard of review allows
"only moderate deference" to be granted to the Department's interpretation of its
regulations and the Employment Security Act, the rationale for even this level of
deference fails in this case. The Utah Administrative Code provides that an employer
may establish the "knowledge" prong by showing that the employee violated a universal
standard of conduct. See UTAH ADMIN. CODE R994-405-202(2) (2000). Universal
standards of conduct are presumed to be generally understood by every worker. By
definition, no special knowledge or expertise is required to interpret universal standards
of conduct. For this reason, the Department can hardly claim a monopoly or any primacy
in its ability to interpret universal standards of conduct. The justification for granting
even modest deference to the Department's decision thus melts away.

The "only moderate deference" standard has also been recognized as the applicable
standard of review by the leading treatise on Utah's standards for appellate review. See
HON. NORMAN H. JACKSON, Utah Standards of Appellate Review—Revised, Utah Bar
Journal, Oct. 1999, at 48 ("Whether [the] agency properly applied the Employment
Security Act and pertinent rules" is a mixed question of law and fact where the
agency's decision is granted "'only moderate deference' because proper application of
the governing law 'requires little highly specialized or technical knowledge that would
be uniquely within the Department's expertise.'") (citation omitted).
5
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This Court should therefore consider affording only modest, if any, deference to
the Department's legal determination that workers may use company equipment to
propagate pornographic images without violating any universal standard of the conduct.
II.

THE DEPARTMENT'S "JUST CAUSE" STANDARD CANNOT BE MORE
STRINGENT THAN THE STATUTORY STANDARD FOR
DISQUALIFICATION.
The Department should not be permitted to inflate its "just cause" criteria into a

more rigorous standard for disqualification than the Utah Legislature established through
the Employment Security Act. The Employment Security Act provides as follows:
An individual is ineligible for benefits . . . [when] the claimant was
discharged for just cause for an act or omission in connection with
employment, not constituting a crime, which is deliberate, willful, or
wanton and adverse to the employer's rightful interest, if so found by
the division.
UTAH CODE ANN. § 35A-4-405(2)(a) (Supp. 2000) (emphasis added).
The Department has taken the position that it is "no longer necessary to adjudicate
cases under the 'deliberate, willful, or wanton and adverse to the employer's rightful
interest' standard" as defined in the Employment Security Act. Appellee's Brief at 14.
Instead, the Department argues that its "just cause" standard should prevail because it is
either equal to or less stringent than the statute. Id. at 14-15.
The Department's application of its regulations, including its criteria for "just
cause" discharges, must always comport with the standards established by the Legislature

6
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in this statute/ The present case illustrates the dangers of the Department's effort to
elevate its administrative standard at the expense of the Legislature's mandate. Indeed,
by misapplying its "just cause" criteria to protect employees who spread sexually-explicit
materials through the workplace, the Department reached a result that cannot be
reconciled with its statutory mandate.
Under the standard defined by the Employment Security Act, Claimants should be
disqualified from receiving unemployment compensation. The Department's factual
findings amply demonstrate that Claimants deliberately engaged in conduct adverse to
Autoliv's rightful interests. For example, the Department found that Claimants sent
numerous personal messages through Autoliv's computer system with "vulgar,"
"offensive" and "sexually explicit" material.4 [R. 53; R. 132; R. 242; R. 321] The
Department also found that Claimants' distribution of this "material in the workplace
could have subjected the employer to sexual harassment claims." [R. 132; R. 321] This
fear was not unfounded. Indeed, the Department's factual findings noted that Autoliv
had discovered Claimants' misconduct during its investigation of a harassment complaint
from a former employee.5 [R. 53; R. 242]

3

"[N]o agency enjoys the discretion to exceed the authority vested in it by the Legislature
and such will be reviewed for legal error, without deference." HON. NORMAN H.
JACKSON, Utah Standards of Appellate Review—Revised, Utah Bar Journal, Oct. 1999,
at 8, 53 n.30 (citations and internal punctuation omitted).
Several of these messages contained short videos with strong sexual themes. For
example, one video carried the title "Wedding Night" whereas another contained closeup images of a woman simulating fellatio. [R. 14; R. 15; R. 17-19]
This finding of fact was made by the Administrative Law Judge. The Department then
adopted the ALJ's findings of fact in whole. See R. 131, R. 320.
7
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The Department thus erred in its application of the Employment Security Act by
not considering the employer's rightful interests. Autoliv, like all Utah employers, has a
compelling interest in preventing and prohibiting all forms of illegal workplace
discrimination, including sexual harassment. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 34A-5-101 et seq.
(Utah Anti-Discrimination Act prohibits discrimination based on race, color, national
origin, gender, religion, age, and disability). In this case, the Department made a factual
finding that Claimants' conduct generated potential liability for the company. It
necessarily follows that Claimants' voluntary and deliberate misconduct was adverse to
the company's rightful interests.
The Department thus failed to properly apply the Department's own factual
findings to the standards established by statute. Claimants' deliberate conduct was
inherently adverse to Autoliv's rightful interests. As a result, Claimants should be
disqualified from receiving unemployment benefits.
III.

THE DEPARTMENT SHOULD HAVE DISQUALIFIED CLAIMANTS
FROM RECEIVING UNEMPLOYMENT UNDER ITS "JUST CAUSE"
STANDARD.
The Department misapplied both the Employment Security Act and the

administrative regulations defining "just cause" by not disqualifying Claimants from
collecting unemployment insurance. The applicable provisions of the Utah
Administrative Code explain that an employer may establish "just cause" for ineligibility
by showing: (1) the employee had knowledge of expected conduct; (2) the offending
conduct fell within the employee's power and capacity to control; and (3) culpability.
See UTAH ADMIN. CODE R994-405-202 (2000). In its decision, the Department held that
8
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the second and third elements were satisfied by the Claimants' misconduct. Only the
Department's application of the first criterion remains at issue.
As explained below, the Department failed to properly apply its factual findings to
the "knowledge" criterion, which explains that "the worker must have had knowledge of
the conduct the employer expected." UTAH ADMIN. CODE R994-405-202(2). The
employer can establish disqualifying knowledge by showing either (1) that the
employee's behavior violated a universal standard of conduct or (2) that the employee
violated a clear policy that had been articulated by the employer. Id. In this case, the
Department's factual findings indicate Claimants violated both universal standards of
conduct and several of Autoliv's policies by sending vulgar, sexually-explicit e-mails
using the company's computer equipment. Autoliv thus carried its burden of establishing
that Claimants had knowledge and were properly discharged for just cause. The
Department's decision should be reversed and Claimants denied unemployment benefits.
A.

Claimants Violated Universal Standards of Conduct By Sending
Sexually-Explicit and Offensive Messages on Autoliv's Computer
System.

The Department's decision cannot withstand reasonable scrutiny because
Claimants offended universal standards of conduct by distributing obscene and otherwise
objectionable material through Autoliv's computer system. Public policy requires the
reversal of the Department's decision because such behavior is incompatible with the
workplace and may be unlawful.
The Department erred when it failed to apply universal standards of conduct to
factual findings that beg for such interpretation. For example, the Department found that
9
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"some of the material [disseminated by Claimants] was sexually explicit and offensive"
and that "[s]uch material in the workplace could have subjected the employer to sexual
harassment claims." [R. 132; R. 321] Of course, this danger was not hypothetical. As
the Department noted, Autoliv uncovered Claimants' misconduct after "receiving] a
complaint from a former employee that some current employees were harassing her with
inappropriate material on the e-mail." [R. 53; R. 242] Autoliv determined during its
investigation that Claimants were "significantly involved in the e-mail abuse." [R. 53; R. 242]
The Department should have disqualified Guzman and King from receiving
unemployment because of this misconduct. After all, Utah courts have recognized that
"sexual harassment is simply unacceptable in today's society." Retherford v. AT&T
Communications, 844 P.2d 949, 978 (Utah 1992). Given the Department's position that
Claimants' distribution of vulgar materials in the workplace could constitute sexual
harassment, it should invariably follow that Claimants transgressed universal standards of
workplace conduct. [R. 132; R. 321]
The Department's failure to apply a universal standard of conduct to its own
factual findings undermines its decision. The Department's opposition brief is silent on
this subject, and its silence is not surprising. No Utah employer can permit or condone
the distribution of obscene and pornographic materials in its workplace. Yet the
Department cannot concede this issue and still prevail in this case. Under the "just
cause" standard championed by the Department, the "knowledge" element is satisfied if
the claimant violated a universal standard of conduct.

10
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Accordingly, if this Court finds—as Autoliv believes it must—that Claimants'
misconduct was incompatible with universal standards of workplace behavior, the
Department's decision cannot stand. This Court must reverse the Department's ruling
and render Claimants ineligible for unemployment benefits.
B.

Claimants Violated Numerous Company Policies By Transmitting
Offensive and Sexually-Explicit Materials Using Autoliv's Computer
System.

Although this Court need not reach this issue if it finds that Claimants violated
universal standards of conduct, the Department's decision is marred by additional error.
The Department misapplied its factual findings to the administrative regulations that
provide for disqualification based on a violation of company policies. As explained
below, the Department's factual findings indicate that (1) Claimants knowingly and
deliberately violated numerous company policies; (2) Claimants received numerous
warnings about the conduct for which they were terminated; and (3) Claimants were
aware that their misconduct could result in termination. As a result, the Claimants had
disqualifying knowledge of their misconduct. The Department's decision must therefore
be reversed.
1.

Claimants' Terminations Were Justified Because Claimants
Violated Numerous Company Policies.

Autoliv satisfied the "knowledge" element of the "just cause" standard by showing
that Claimants were given written policies spelling out the company's expected standards
of behavior. See UTAH ADMIN. CODE R994-405-202. While the Department's decision
addresses only Autoliv's e-mail policy, Claimants did not violate this policy alone. By
11
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sending "inappropriate," "offensive," "vulgar," and "sexual-explicit" e-mails on
Autoliv's computer system, despite several warnings to the contrary, Claimants failed to
abide by numerous other policies. [R. 53; R. 132; R. 242; R. 321] At the very least,
Claimants' misconduct violated the following company policies:
•
•

•

•

Autoliv 's sexual harassment policy, which states that the company will not
"tolerate or permit illegal harassment or retaliation of any nature." [R. 5]
Autoliv's computer use policy, which prohibits (1) "[unauthorized or
inappropriate computer use," (2) "[u]se of e-mail for reasons other than
transmittal of business related information," and (3) "[cjonduct that reflects
unfavorably upon the corporation." [R. 2]
Autoliv's e-mail policy, which specified that "E-mail should be used for
company business communication only" and that "[i]f you receive an
inappropriate E-mail, delete it and do not forward it to anyone." [R. 10-11]
Autoliv's policy for general conduct, which states that "each employee is
expected to maintain conduct consistent with job efficiency and accepted
standards of behavior for a business environment." [R. 4]

The Department thus erred because Claimants engaged in conduct that clearly
violated several of Autoliv's reasonable rules and standards of conduct. By
acknowledging only the e-mail policy, the Department totally ignored Autoliv's rightful
interest in enforcing its other policies such as those prohibiting sexual harassment and
dishonorable conduct. After all, Claimants were not discharged for a minor infraction of
the e-mail policy; rather, Claimants were terminated for just cause because they violated
numerous company policies when they trafficked in obscenity on company time with
company property.
2.

Autoliv Issued Several Warnings to Claimants Regarding
Proper Computer Usage.

Autoliv was entitled to terminate Claimants for just cause because they persisted
in abusing their e-mail privileges after receiving at least three warnings. Each of these
12
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cautions came with clear instructions to stop sending videos Jokes, and non-business
materials through the company's computer accounts. Such clear warnings satisfy the
"knowledge" element of the Utah Administrative Code's "just cause" criteria:
A specific warning is one way to show the worker had knowledge of the
expected conduct. After a warning the worker should have been given
an opportunity to correct the objectionable conduct.
UTAH ADMIN. CODE

R994-405-202

The Department did not properly apply this administrative provision to its factual
findings. After first finding that Autoliv had sent Claimants "[a]t least three company
memos . . . regarding appropriate use of e-mail," and then noting that these notices
warned that future violations "could result in disciplinary action and/or termination," the
Department inexplicably ignored the legal import of these warnings. [R. 53; R. 242;
R. 11]
The Department thus misapplied the law to undisputed facts. Utah courts permit
zero tolerance of sexual harassment, yet Guzman and King three times ignored the
Company's mandates and imperiled their employment by repeatedly transmitting
sexually-explicit materials via company e-mail.7 Because Claimants knew that they were

The Department also argues that there is "an inconsistency between the way Autoliv's
policies are written and the way they are enforced." Appellee's Brief at 12. This
argument is belied by the testimony of Claimant Thomas King, who acknowledged that
Autoliv has consistently enforced its prohibition against pornography in the workplace:
"I know that some of the E-mail that - there has [sic] been other people that have been
terminated for pornography and things like that, I understand that, and I agree with
that." [R.240, 18:16-18]
The Department's decision focused almost exclusively the quantity of Claimants'
e-mail messages rather than on their sexually-explicit content. The severity of the
13
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engaging in misconduct, this Court should strike out the Department's decision and deny
unemployment benefits to Claimants.
3.

Claimants Should Have Anticipated the Consequences of Their
Misconduct Because Autoliv Clearly and Repeatedly Articulated
Its Policies.

The Department erred in its application of the "knowledge" criterion because
Autoliv repeatedly articulated the company's expectations for conduct and the
consequences of misconduct. Both Guzman and King admitted that they received
Autoliv's handbook, which included the company's general conduct, sexual harassment,
discipline, and computer usage policies. [R. 51, 18:33-35, 19:24-26; R. 240, 19:5-7, 3235] The Department also found that Autoliv had, on at least three occasions, distributed
to Claimants copies of the company's e-mail policy, which states that "E-mail was for
o

business use only."
Autoliv put all of its employees on notice that policy violations could result in
termination. The discipline policy explains that "[disciplinary action may be taken for
violation of any single rule or combination of rules, or for other improper conduct" and
that such disciplinary action "may include . . . termination." [R. 4] Autoliv also
discipline imposed on Claimants came as a consequence both of the volume and nature
of the messages.
o

Guzman admitted that he had not read one of the messages containing the warning that
violations of the company's computer and e-mail policies could result in discipline
"including] termination." [R. 7-8] Apparently Guzman believed that truly businessrelated e-mail messages—such as Roger Tea's memorandum, which was addressed to
all employees—were "junk mail." [R. 51, 21:14-15, 31-33] It was Guzman's habit to
delete and ignore such messages. In contrast, Guzman somehow found the time to open
14
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conveyed the importance of its computer use and e-mail policies by warning that
transgressions of these policies could result in termination. [R. 6; R. 7-8; R. 10-11]
Claimants thus knew that they were violating company policies and thus
imperiling their jobs when they spread offensive materials using Autoliv's network.
Indeed, Autoliv's investigation found a remarkable e-mail that King sent to a colleague
on December 14, 1999. King tacitly acknowledged that he was jeopardizing his job by
sending obscene e-mails, writing:
When I send you things please be very discrete about it before
showing anyone. [SJome of the things I get is [sic] a little risque for
most viewers and I do like my job a little,
[R. 188 (emphasis added)]
This evidence contradicts the Board's explanation that "the claimant did not know
his usage of the employer's e-mail was of such serious concern to the employer that he
was in danger of discharge." [R. 132; R. 321] In fact, Claimants were keenly aware that
their conduct was inconsistent with Autoliv's standards and could warrant immediate

and forward non-business e-mail that contained offensive and sexually-explicit
messages.
15
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discharge. As a result, Autoliv established the "knowledge" prong of the "just cause"
standard. The Department's decision should be reversed.9
IV.

AUTOLIV PROPERLY MARSHALED THE EVIDENCE IN THIS
APPEAL.
There is no merit to the Department's accusation that Autoliv failed to marshal the

evidence. More than a dozen pages in Autoliv's opening brief are devoted to a thorough
recitation of the facts, and Autoliv mentioned all of the facts relied upon by the
Department in reaching its adverse decision. The Department's allegation that Autoliv
"only marshaled the evidence in support of the outcome it desires" rings hollow.
Appellee's Brief at 6. Notably, the Department did not identify a single material fact
supposedly absent from Autoliv ys statement of facts. Instead, the Department weakly
complains that Autoliv added emphasis to two sentences of Roger Tea's September 8,

The Department also defends its decision by advancing a new argument: that the
"knowledge" prong was not satisfied because Autoliv allegedly failed to follow a
progressive disciplinary policy. See Appellee's Brief at 10-14. This contention fails for
several reasons. First, neither the ALJ nor the Appeals Board made a finding that Autoliv
had a progressive disciplinary policy. See R. 52-56; R. 131-135; R. 241-245; R. 320-324.
Such a finding would have not have been consistent with the evidence, particularly in
light of the terms of Autoliv's policies. The Department's new "finding" emerges from
its interpretation of a single paragraph in Roger Tea's September 8, 1998 memorandum.
This Court should reject the Department's effort to construct a wholesale, company-wide
progressive discipline policy from a statement that included the qualification that
disciplinary action "could include termination." [R. 7-8]
Second, even if Autoliv had a progressive disciplinary policy, Autoliv would still have
been entitled to terminate Claimants for just cause due to the "serious nature" of their
misconduct. See Bhatia v. Dep 7 Employment Sec, 834 P.2d 574, 580 n.5 (Utah Ct. App.
1992). Although the Department suggests that Autoliv should have merely issued a
warning to Claimants after their conduct generated a complaint of sexual harassment, this
Court has previously denied benefits when an employer with a progressive disciplinary
policy terminated an employee for violating universal standards of conduct. Id.
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1998 memorandum. This criticism seems particularly misplaced given that Autoliv
reprinted the entire text, not selective passages, of Tea's letter in its opening brief.
Although Autoliv's compilation of evidence is sufficient to satisfy any marshalling
obligation, it is nevertheless important to note that the Department's argument begins
from a false premise. The obligation to marshal the evidence arises where a party is
challenging findings of fact made by an agency or trial court. See, e.g., HON. NORMAN
H. JACKSON, Utah Standards of Appellate Review—Revised, Utah Bar Journal, Oct.
1999, at 12, 44, 52 n.7. In this case, the Department purports to limit Autoliv's appeal to
a challenge of the Department's findings of fact. Thus, the Department argues that
"Autoliv has challenged the Workforce Appeals Board!'s factual findings that the
claimants lacked sufficient knowledge in this instance to merit a denial of unemployment
insurance benefits." Appellee's Brief at 9 (emphasis added). As explained above, this
Court should resist the Department's efforts both to reclassify its legal conclusions as
factual findings and to mischaracterize the nature of Autoliv's appeal. The Department's
decision should be reversed because the Agency misapplied the Employment Security
Act to the undisputed facts that Claimants disseminated sexually-explicit e-mails using
Autoliv's computer system.
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CONCLUSION
Because Claimants Guzman and King engaged in disqualifying conduct by using
their employer's computer system to distribute offensive, explicit, and sexually-oriented
materials, this Court should reverse the decision of the Department of Workforce
Services. Unemployment benefits should therefore be denied to Guzman and King.
DATED this / 2 ^ day of February, 2001.
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER

r

^

Janet Hugie Smith
Paul C. Burke
Attorneys for Petitioner Autoliv ASP, Inc.
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